Second Circuit Reshapes the Standard for Title VII Religious Accommodation Claims, by Siobhan Healy, Esq. and Alexandra Sasha Robins, Esq., 8-12-2026

A significant appellate decision changes the framework courts in the Second Circuit use to evaluate Title VII religious accommodation claims. In Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the longstanding Second Circuit test used to evaluate Title VII failure-to-accommodate religion claims was abrogated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

Although the decision is binding only in the Second Circuit—which covers Connecticut, New York, and Vermont—it may influence how courts elsewhere evaluate Title VII religious accommodation claims.

The decision shifts the focus of the prima facie inquiry away from treating employer knowledge of the need for an accommodation as a required element and instead toward whether the employee actually required an accommodation of a religious belief or practice and whether the employer’s desire to avoid providing that accommodation was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.

The Court Abandons the Prior Second Circuit Test
For decades, courts in the Second Circuit applied a three-part framework to Title VII religious-accommodation claims. To establish a prima facie case, an employee generally had to show that they:

• Held a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with a work requirement;
• Informed the employer of that conflict; and
• Suffered discipline for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.

See, e.g., Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985), aff’d and remanded, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001).

In Bergin, however, the Second Circuit concluded that this framework had been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Abercrombie. The court explained that Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision focuses on an employer’s motive rather than its knowledge of the need for an accommodation. As a result, proof that an employer knew of the need for an accommodation is no longer a required element of a prima facie case. Although knowledge of the need for an accommodation may be evidence of motive, the absence of such evidence is not dispositive.

Instead, the court held that a plaintiff must establish that the employee actually required an accommodation of a religious belief or practice and that the employer’s desire to avoid providing that actually required prospective accommodation was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.

The Decision
The case arose after a New York court officer was terminated for failing to comply with the Unified Court System’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement after her request for a religious exemption was denied. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the employee, concluding that she had established a prima facie case and that the employer had failed to demonstrate undue hardship.

The Second Circuit vacated that judgment and remanded the case, holding that the district court applied an outdated legal standard and improperly treated certain discovery statements as binding judicial admissions. The court directed the district court to reassess whether summary judgment in favor of either party is appropriate under the Abercrombie standard.

What Employers Should Do Now
Although Bergin does not alter employers’ substantive obligation under Title VII to reasonably accommodate sincerely held religious beliefs and practices absent undue hardship, it may affect how Title VII failure-to-accommodate religion claims are litigated in the Second Circuit.

Employers should consider:

• Reviewing religious accommodation policies and procedures to ensure requests are evaluated consistently and documented thoroughly;
• Training human resources professionals and supervisors on the continued importance of engaging in a careful, individualized accommodation process;
• Ensuring that decision makers clearly document the legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons supporting adverse employment decisions;
• Consulting counsel before denying religious accommodation requests that could later give rise to litigation.

Key Takeaway
The Second Circuit’s decision represents an important shift in how Title VII religious accommodation claims will be analyzed in Connecticut, New York, and Vermont. Employers should continue engaging in an individualized accommodation process while ensuring accommodation requests and related employment decisions are well documented and supported by legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons.

Authors:
Siobhan Healy
Partner
Alexandra Sasha Robins
Of Counsel